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 Independent partially upgradable mandatory access control system   
ABSTRACT 
Mandatory access control (MAC) is a mechanism by which an operating system 
provides a secure computing environment by restricting the ability of processes or threads to 
perform operations on objects.  Objects are provided with type labels and a policy that governs 
how interactions between labeled objects may occur. MAC systems enforce a centralized policy 
that governs access to the entire system and is incompatible with operating systems where 
components are separately owned and upgraded.  
This disclosure provides techniques to write security policies for objects that are 
accessed by both platform and non-platform components. Per techniques disclosed, secure 
access to objects within separately owned components is provided by converting labels 
assigned to OS objects to versioned attributes that are inherited by future labels of those objects. 
A mapping is created and maintained between different versions of a label. The mapping is 
used to ensure that security policy works across versions of objects. The techniques enable new 
policies to be implemented, or old policies to be changed, without affecting non-platform 
components, and permit non-platform components to upgrade and eventually lose deprecated 
rules.    
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 BACKGROUND 
 Mandatory access control (MAC) is a technique to create a secure computing 
environment by restricting the ability of processes or threads to perform operations on objects. 
MAC functionality is provided by operating systems, e.g., SELinux is a popular Linux kernel-
based module that provides MAC. SELinux builds on the linux security modules (LSM) of the 
linux kernel to enable the definition of policy indicating how objects as defined within LSM 
and user-space components interact. 
 
Fig. 1: Partitions of a mobile device 
Fig. 1 shows example partitions of a mobile computing device, e.g., a smartphone. 
Certain images within the partition, e.g., “boot,” “recovery,” “system,” etc. include operating 
system kernel/ framework code and configurations, and are accessible by the platform vendor, 
e.g., a manufacturer of mobile device. Other images, e.g., “vendor,”, “radio,” etc. include code 
specific or proprietary to a System-on-a-Chip (SoC) vendor. Other images, e.g., “odm,” “oem,” 
etc., include code or configurations specific to an original device manufacturer (ODM) and 
original equipment manufacturer (or carrier).  
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 Recent trends in operating system design call for a split of the OS into different 
components, e.g., to enable separate ownership and upgradability of individual components. As 
illustrated above, one component may be owned by the OS platform, while another by an 
ODM, yet another by the SoC vendor, etc. One goal of splitting the OS into independently 
upgradable components is to allow SoC vendors, ODMs, OEMs etc. to customize their 
components, e.g., SELinux settings, in an isolated manner without cross-partition 
modifications. However, the MAC model for secure computing, which requires centralized 
policy that governs access for the entire system, is incompatible with the splitting of the OS into 
independently upgradable components. At present, if the owner of one part of the system does 
not know the composition of another part, it is not possible to write policy that is centrally 
unified and applicable to all objects on a system.  
SELinux attempts to address the problem of vendor-specific customization by allowing 
for policy modules on top of a base module. In this technique, a base reference policy provides 
policy common to a particular OS distribution. The base policy can be added to by adding new 
policy in the form of modules. However, this technique relies on the module policy writers 
knowing the base policy against which the modules are being written. This is not necessarily 
true in the case of operating systems with independently upgradable components, since the 
platform component can itself be upgraded independent of the non-platform components. Thus, 
the platform component (which is analogous to the base reference policy of SELinux) can 
effectively change from underneath the module writer. This can render invalid an access policy 
rule or label type that is relied upon by a policy module. The approach of SELinux to vendor-
specific customization allows for the platform or base-policy writer to not know about device-
specific policy. However, this approach doesn’t allow for independent platform upgrades. 
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 The technique of using versions for labels has been used in the past. However, versions 
have generally been used to target symbols in shared libraries, archives, or object files. Such 
version labeling applies, e.g., to code compilation and linking, rather than OS objects that each 
have only one non-duplicable label. Current version labeling is not compatible with the one 
central policy of the MAC model that requires updated platform and non-platform policies to 
combine to generate one functional unit, rather than simply targeting one or the other.    
DESCRIPTION 
In an operating system with independently upgradable components the platform has 
limited or no knowledge of the additional components that will be provided by individual 
vendors. Correspondingly, vendors do not know the future composition of an upgraded 
platform. Recognizing that there exist objects that are accessed by both platform and non-
platform (e.g., device- or vendor-specific) components, object-access policy is written for both 
types of components. Such object-access policy depends on version of the labels of objects.  
Techniques of this disclosure enforce, through policy and testing, the following 
conditions: 
● The labels of an object are owned by only one of the platform policies and non-platform 
policies. 
● A dependency on the platform by a non-platform component such that the platform can 
upgrade without an upgrade to the non-platform component is permitted. However, the 
reverse is disallowed such that non-platform policy always targets a particular platform. 
Existing MAC infrastructure is modified such that the ownership is respected in accordance 
with the above conditions. There rules are maintained while still allowing the different policies 
to be combined.  
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 Under the above conditions, techniques of this disclosure provide secure access to 
objects within separately owned components as follows: 
● The platform MAC policy is divided into public and private components. The public 
component consists of the type labels and attributes of the portions of the system which 
the non-platform components interact with and write policy for. This is equivalent to an 
API definition between the platform and non-platform components. 
● The public MAC policy is exported to enable its inclusion as part of the non-platform 
policy. At the interface between platform and non-platform components, all concrete 
types (labels) assigned to OS objects are converted into versioned attributes that can be 
inherited by future labels of those objects, whether such objects are the same or 
changed. In an implementation, each label has a version-attribute chain that extends 
back to all the versions that exist for the object it represents. This ensures that the non-
platform policy can interoperate with those objects as before.  
● A mapping between the exported types of one platform version and future versions is 
created and maintained. This enables any changes to the labels of the objects at 
platform-device interface to be mapped back to old, versioned labels. In an 
implementation, multiple different mappings that each correspond to an old version are 
tracked and the appropriate version is chosen during operation. In this manner, objects 
that are labeled with a type do not break behavior guaranteed by the public component 
of the policy in a previous version.  Old policy continues to work upon objects even 
when a platform is upgraded. 
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 Techniques of this disclosure represent objects of an OS as an API and enable 
versioning of object types. Compatibility is maintained across the platform-device interface via 
a mapping, e.g., a mapping file that tracks future development. These techniques enable new 
policies to be implemented or old policies to be changed with no effect on non-platform 
components, e.g., without breaking assumptions made by non-platform components. 
Implementing these techniques allows non-platform components to upgrade and eventually lose 
deprecated rules.  
Per the techniques disclosed herein, a strict interface between platform and non-platform 
components is enforced by MAC while maintaining the traditional guarantees provided by the 
MAC, e.g., a centralized policy, even in the absence of knowledge of the entire system.  
Strict rules are placed to define the platform-device interface. Implementations of these 
techniques may require sacrificing some policy flexibility. Further, some testing or 
development burden is added in order to ensure compliance with the rules and avoid future 
incompatibility issues. However, these burdens may be small in comparison with benefits of the 
techniques in providing secure computing within the context of independently upgradable OS 
components. Alternative solutions to the proposed techniques have their own drawbacks. For 
example, committing to a strict API from a policy development perspective and preventing 
changes to labels of interface-level objects eliminates the useful facility of MAC customization 
or policy tightening for the purpose of hardened security. As a further example, changing the 
LSM MAC infrastructure to enable objects to have two simultaneous labels may be a rather 
invasive change and can make the security policy less clear and less secure.  
Techniques of this disclosure apply to any MAC system, including that provided by the 
framework of SELinux. If implemented under SELinux, versioning is done by using SELinux 
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 attributes, specifically turning types into versioned attributes, such that new or changed types 
can automatically act as though these were referred to before.  
CONCLUSION 
 Mandatory access control (MAC) within operating systems is a mechanism to provide a 
secure computing environment. MAC works by labeling objects and enforcing policy that 
governs interactions between labeled objects. The mechanism of MAC requires enforcement of 
a centralized policy applicable to the entire system. Centralized access policy, however, is 
incompatible with modular operating systems that allow independent upgrades to components. 
This disclosure addresses the problem of secure access to objects accessed by independently 
upgradable OS components. Per technique disclosed herein, a versioning system is 
implemented for such objects. In effect, objects of an OS are represented as an API that 
supports versioning of object types. To retain interoperability between components as they 
upgrade independently, a mapping of labels is created and maintained. This mapping is used to 
ensure that policy works across versions of objects. 
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